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Professor René Lemarchand is an internationally renowned expert on the cycle of violence in Central Africa and emeritus professor of political science at the University of Florida. He has been studying Africa for half a century and has written the standard works on Burundi and Rwanda. Professor Lemarchand's chief focus has been on ethnic conflict in Central Africa, particularly in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He has published several books, including *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa and Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial and Memory*. He has also worked as a consultant in governance for USAID in Abidjan and as governance and democracy adviser to USAID Ghana.

Ten years ago, Mme. Simone Veil, director of the Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah Foundation in Paris, and Sir Geoffrey Nice, chief prosecutor in the Milosevic case at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, opened this annual NIOD series. Among the other experts who have honoured us through the years were Yehuda Bauer, Saul Friedlander, and Sir Ian Kershaw. Today transitional justice is an important research line at the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Moreover, together with our Collections Division, we are proud to be embarking on several projects with the Kigali Genocide Memorial, so Africa has become a new area of focus for the NIOD. For these and other reasons, we were particularly delighted when Professor Lemarchand did us the honour of accepting our invitation to give the 10th annual lecture.

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The Politics of Memory in the Great Lakes Region

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My subject today is about the relationship of memory to myth-making in the three states that once were part of Belgian Africa – Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo. This is a complex and tragic story. My take on these events is likely to raise the hackles of not a few people in the audience. But if I happen to ruffle a few feathers, I hope that it will be for a good cause: the cause of truth.

All states legitimize the present by recourse to the past. Whether remembered, invented, or falsified, past events are enshrined in symbols, rituals, commemorations, and historical narratives which together form the texture of national myths. From this perspective myth-making is what creates a sense of belonging to a nation. But there is a sense in which precisely the opposite is the case, as when it becomes a tool for deliberately distorting the past. (As a French-born citizen I am old enough to be reminded of the unifying bonds surrounding the myth of the French Resistance in World War II, but also of the violent discords generated by the myth of *Algérie Française*, which, as a draft dodger, I had the change to denounce on more than one occasion.)

Whether distorting the past can unify or divide the nation is a matter of opinion. Consider Ernest Renan's much-quoted statement in his famous essay on "What is a Nation?": its members "should have many things in common, *and they should forget a lot of things*" including, he adds, the Saint Bartholemew and the massacres in 13th century Provence.¹ But if selective oblivion is a necessary ingredient of nation-building, exactly what to forget is an open question. Persuasive as it may sound to some, Renan's position is one that is unlikely to win universal approval. I, for one, intend to take the opposite view, arguing that amnesia – here meaning not just a total or partial loss of memory, but one that is consciously encouraged or officially sanctioned – is likely to greatly complicate the birth of a nation at peace with itself. This is particularly the case where ethnic communities have experienced traumatic events – genocide or ethnic cleansing – and where the denial of such facts by one group or another only serves to

drive them further apart from each other. Exemplary in this regard are the cases at hand.

[Let me pause here for a moment, and introduce a personal note. Part of my fascination with memorial themes has to do with my French background. The French are obsessed with the theme of memory. “*Le devoir de mémoire*” is a phrase that comes up time and again in the media and academic discourse. But if remembering is a duty, we are seldom told what it is that needs to be remembered. As one who lived in France during the Nazi occupation, and who later refused to serve in Algeria, the phrasing – the duty to remember – remains profoundly ambivalent.² Am I to remember the atrocities, including torture, committed by the French army in Algeria, or instead those committed by Algerian rebels?³ Am I to remember the wholesale massacre of tens of thousands of Algerian civilians in Sétif in 1945, or the local uprising that led to it? And what about the role of the Vichy police in rounding up 13,152 Jewish men, women and children during the infamous 1942 Rafle du Vel d’Hiv, and later sent to their graves in German concentration camps, – how can it be possibly redeemed by the exalted heroism of the French resistance? Only recently have the French come to terms with the seamier side of their past. If I mention these prolonged “lapses” in France’s official memory, this is because they have a hauntingly familiar ring to those of us interested in probing the politics of memory in the Great Lakes.]

To return to ex-Belgian Africa: All three states have a history of genocidal murder; they each claim populations that share the same cultural background and ethno-linguistic traits (Hutu and Tutsi), and in each state Hutu and Tutsi bear a measure of responsibility in the chain of events leading to mass murder; finally, and most importantly, in all three cases, albeit with varying degrees of calculated deceit, historical truths have been manipulated to serve the interests of ruling elites.⁴

Despite common features, their histories, though intertwined, are distinctive. This is not the place for a detailed reconstruction of their tormented trajectories; a more useful approach is to take a critical look at some of the most widely accepted, though profoundly mistaken assumptions surrounding their agonies. Though frequently challenged, they constitute the bedrock of what passes for conventional wisdom.

Unwarranted Assumptions

Among the many mistaken assumptions about the Rwanda genocide, the most widespread is that it is reducible to a Manichean struggle between good and evil, killers and victims, Hutu and Tutsi.⁵

I am not questioning the responsibility of the Hutu *génocidaires* in orchestrating the extermination of over 600,000 Tutsi civilians and tens of thousands of moderate Hutu. Nor is there any doubt in my mind about the deliberate, intentional character of the killings. The problem with this scenario is not that it is wrong, but that it tells only part of the story. If we are to grasp the complexity of the Rwandan bloodbath, it is important to remember (a) that there would have been no genocide had the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) not invaded the country on October 1, 1990, with Uganda's military and logistical assistance; (b) that the bitter civil war ignited by the invasion (1990-1994) has been accompanied by countless atrocities committed by both sides; (c) that Hutu participation in the killings did not involve the near totality of the Hutu population, as some Tutsi ideologues have claimed,⁶ but, as Scott Straus convincingly shows, between 7 and 8 per cent of the active Hutu population and 14 to 17 per cent of the active adult male Hutu population;⁷ (d) that in the wake of seizing power, on July 4, 1994, Kagame's refugee warriors (*Inkontanyi*) engaged in systematic revenge killings of tens of thousands of Hutu civilians, including women, children and elderly people.⁸ Clearly, to reduce the dynamics of genocidal violence to a deadly struggle between Tutsi good guys and Hutu bad guys is a non-starter. Nor is the onus of guilt for shooting down the presidential plane, on April 6, 1994, to be categorically assigned to Hutu hard-liners (*akazu*), as many observers still insist. For all the talk about the absence of a "smoking gun", if the weight of circumstantial evidence is any guide, and the testimonies of defectors to be trusted, Paul Kagame stands as the central actor responsible for precipitating the carnage. In short, to leave out of the picture the crimes committed by the RPF flies in the face of the evidence, and can only lead to a misreading of the historical record.

The next assumption that needs to be challenged is that the Rwanda genocide is the first ever recorded in former Belgian Africa.

Leaving aside the mass murders attributed to the Leopoldian regime, which some would not hesitate to label genocide,⁹ it is important to remember that another genocide had been committed in Burundi 22 years before the Rwandan tragedy, resulting in the deaths of anywhere from 200,000 to 300,000 Hutu civilians at the hands of a predominantly Tutsi army.¹⁰ Unlike what happened in

Rwanda, the perpetrators won the day (which is why the history of 1972 is by now largely forgotten). Although the killings came about in response to a local Hutu uprising, the scale of the retribution leaves no doubt about its genocidal character. The consequences have been profound. Besides creating the conditions of Tutsi supremacy for the next two decades, it helps explain the reluctance of many Tutsi hard-liners in the army and the government to accept the verdict of the polls in 1973, i.e. the shift of power to the first popularly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. His assassination, on October 21, 1973, was the triggering factor behind the vicious civil war that went on for the next twelve years, causing untold casualties among Hutu and Tutsi.

Equally untenable is the view that security concerns were the sole motive behind Kagame's decision to invade eastern DRC in 1996; while there is no denying the threats posed to Rwanda's security by tens of thousands of armed génocidaires fleeing their homeland, it is by now equally plain that what began as a search and destroy operation quickly morphed into a genocidal exercise.

On this the evidence offered by the 2010 UN Mapping Report is extensive, and entirely convincing (notwithstanding Rwanda's vehement denials).¹¹ The report is perhaps best described as an unrelenting chronicle of countless atrocities committed against Hutu civilians over a period of six months in hundreds of rural communities and towns in eastern DRC, from Kisangani to Mbandaka. Long before the publication of the UN report Stephen Smith – one of the few journalists to have taken a critical look at the evidence – claimed that as many as 200,000 Hutu may have died in 1996-1997 at the hands of the Rwandan army and its Congolese ally, the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo* (AFDL), headed by Laurent Kabila. This is now substantially confirmed. Although the Rwandan authorities spared no effort to present the victims as *génocidaires*, the body of circumstantial evidence supplied by the UN report conclusively shows that the majority were innocent civilians. That the AFDL, comprising a large proportion of ethnic Tutsi, or *banyamulenge*, served as an auxiliary force to the Rwandan army helps explain why, to this day, the Congolese Tutsi are globally seen by self-styled “autochtons” with enormous suspicion, some comparing them to a fifth column in the pay of the Rwandan state.

How, then, have these events shaped the memorial strategies observable in each state?

Memorial Strategies

Rwanda: Official Memory as Myth-Making

Of the three states under consideration, only in Rwanda has there been a consistent state-sponsored effort to legitimize a Manichean view of history – an attitude which, in Primo Levi’s apt phrasing, “shuns half-tints and complexities”.¹² It is not by coincidence, therefore, if references to Hutu victims are conspicuously absent from the annual mourning ceremonies. Paraphrasing Pierre Nora, one might say that there is Kagame’s official memory, “blind to all but the group it binds”,¹³ and there is Hutu memory, left in a state of limbo.

As one who has been taken to task by Kagame for “suggesting that the memory of the Hutu victims of genocide has been thwarted or that there has been a clash of ethnic memories in Rwanda” – a misrepresentation, he adds, “illustrative of the degeneracy of this emerging revisionism”¹⁴ – I am acutely aware of just how sensitive memorial issues are in contemporary Rwanda: they are intimately connected to issues of ethnicity, and therefore call into question the wisdom of the regime’s policy of eliminating ethnic labels.

Rwanda has become the site of one of the most radical experiments in social engineering anywhere in the continent. Only in Rwanda have ethnic identities been legislated out of existence, at a stroke of the presidential pen. Proceeding from the assumption that the roots of the genocide are to be found in the manipulation of ethnic identities, a fact traceable to the colonial era, the key to post genocide reconstruction lies in the elimination of references to Hutu and Tutsi and their replacement by the term “Banyarwanda” as the conflict-free, all-embracing identity marker. Rwanda is the only state in Central Africa where Hutu and Tutsi have disappeared from the ethnic map.

Anyone seeking to challenge this spectacular sleight of hand does so at his/her own risks: consider the fate of opposition leader Victoire Ingabire, currently serving a long prison sentence for questioning why the memorial to the victims of the genocide only mentioned Tutsi; by merely raising this question she laid herself open to charges of “divisionism”, thus violating article 33 of the Rwandan constitution which explicitly condemns all forms of divisionism, including “propagation of ethnic, regional, racial discrimination or any other form of division”.

The “invention of tradition” was an important feature of the Rwanda monarchy long before the phrase was coined by modern historians. The myth-makers par excellence were the court historians, perhaps best represented by the late Alexis Kagame, whose task as a historian was inseparable from his role of ideologue at the service of the monarchy. “The essence of his vision”, writes Vansina, “comes from the royal court and more precisely from a handful of courtiers who

were official ideologues in charge of giving a meaning to history and of elaborating the official version of its details. *It was their task to set it forth, to hold it, to defend it against heresy, to elaborate on it, and to apply it to all historical genres practiced at the court* (my emphasis).¹⁵ In this regard today's Rwanda remains faithful to its monarchical tradition: a new form of myth-making has emerged to legitimize the present, in which the historiography of the genocide is inseparable from regime ideology – a situation strikingly reminiscent of the time when the other Kagame (Alexis) held sway over the *abiru*, the keepers of the esoteric code of the monarchy, ensuring that “the written historiography would merely reproduce the royal ideology as it existed around 1900.”¹⁶

Burundi: The Reign of the Unsaid

How Burundi grapples with its past by ignoring it is inscribed in its tragically complicated history. In addition to being the site of the first genocide recorded in Central Africa, it claims the highest rate of heads of state and of government to be sent to their graves by an assassin's bullet (the list includes Prince Rewagasore in 1961, Pierre Ngendandumwe and Joseph Bamina in 1965, ex-king Ntare in 1972, and Melchior Ndadaye in 1973). Ndadaye's assassination triggered an exceedingly brutal ten-year civil war, resulting in the loss of an estimated 300,000 lives, evenly distributed between Hutu and Tutsi.

The most remarkable aspect of Burundi's recent history is the extent to which Hutu-Tutsi enmities have now virtually evaporated. This doesn't mean that there is no conflict but that conflict revolves around issues other than ethnicity. Having said that, the civil war has not been forgotten. Nor is the likelihood of a resurgence of ethnic conflict to be ruled out. Of this President Nkurunziza is fully aware, and that goes also for the vast majority of the Burundi. “Forgive and forget” is a subtext that underlies popular attitudes as well as public policies.

As recent research by Bert Ingelaere shows,¹⁷ many Burundi would go along with the popular wisdom expressed in the proverb “*nta kuzura akaboze*” (“one doesn't have to dig up that which has been rotten”). This posture reflects in part the realization that both Hutu and Tutsi politicians have blood on their hands. As one observer put it, “as many of them have blood-stained hands, their interests converge in having as little truth and accountability as possible”.¹⁸ In such circumstances, and given the weakness of the justice system, meting out a just punishment for past crimes would be highly problematic. All the more so when one considers the fragility of the power-sharing arrangement that forms the core principle of the political regime.

The result has been to institutionalize the unsaid, “le non-dit”, a situation where self-censorship becomes a guarantee of stability. Official reluctance to tell

the truth about the past explains why to this day the much-touted Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has yet to get off the ground, and live up to its mandate as defined in the Arusha Agreement. Negotiations between the UN and the Burundi government on the establishment of a special tribunal that would act independently of the government and the TRC led to an impasse as the government “insisted that only cases referred to by the TRC should be investigated and prosecuted by the tribunal”.¹⁹ It would take an unusual dose of optimism to expect the TRC to ever become operational.

The weight of the precolonial past also deserves passing consideration. In contrast with Rwanda where the job of court historians was to salvage the official version of the past, forgetting the past was a conspicuous trait of precolonial Burundi. To quote from Vansina, “The Rundi political system did not favor historical memory... It was in everyone’s interest to forget the past... The former senior regent of the country told me that history was of no interest at the court so there were practically no historical accounts. The political system shows why”.²⁰ Vansina’s observation has lost none of its pertinence. Today as in ancient times it is in everyone’s interest to forget the past.

DRC: The Denial of History

Eastern Congo offers another example of how manipulated memory thwarts reconciliation. By reducing inherently complex and fragmented identities to a polarizing dichotomy – “autochtones” vs. “allochtones” – native Congolese have sown the seeds of persistent enmities between themselves and the so-called Banyamulenge. Although the term is often used to designate all Tutsi residents of eastern Congo, strictly speaking the Banyamulenge are a specific Tutsi subgroup, concentrated in the high-lying Itombwe plateau in South Kivu. They migrated from Rwanda in the late 18th or early 19th centuries, long before the advent of colonial rule. They came to refer to themselves as Banyamulenge in the early 1970s to make clear their *Congolese* rather than their Rwandan identity. As such they differ in some important ways from the thousands of Tutsi refugees who were forced out of Rwanda by the Hutu revolution of 1959, and from those Kinyarwanda-speaking elements (Hutu and Tutsi) who are indigenous to North Kivu.

How, then, is history being denied?

First, by lumping together into a single ethnic category (Banyamulenge) communities that are singularly diverse in terms of their arrival into the country, the circumstances of their arrival, and their areas of settlement. Denying the right of

citizenship to communities that came to the DRC before the advent of colonization is unacceptable. What makes it acceptable to most native Congolese, however, is the allegation that they are *all* recent migrants from Rwanda. Which is why, presumably, they owe their political loyalties, first and foremost, to Rwanda.

History is being denied in another sense: While many ethnic Tutsi have been, and remain to this day, Rwanda's closest allies in the Congo (just how many is impossible to say), this fact needs to be placed in a broader historical perspective: No one can deny the crucial assistance given by the Banyamulenge to the Rwandan invaders during the first and second Congo wars, but it is only fair to add that they themselves had been consistently targeted by the provincial authorities of South Kivu, at one point ordered to leave the country and return to where they belong: Rwanda. Given the threats to their lives, who can blame them for joining hands with the only state willing and able to protect them?

Again, to hold an entire ethnic community responsible for the massive human rights violations committed by a handful of leaders – their names are well-known: Mutebutsi, Nkunda, Ntaganda, Sultani – is not the best way to prepare the ground for a modicum of peace and mutual tolerance among ethnic communities. Admittedly, the nexus of interests between Rwanda and a segment of the Congolese Tutsi community cannot be ignored. It remains to this day a major threat to peace in the region, as shown by the continuing violence in North Kivu between M23, on the one hand, and the UN brigade and Monusco on the other. But this is hardly a sufficient basis for holding to account the entire Tutsi community, especially when one considers that a great many non-Tutsi elements, including Hutu, have joined the M23 crusade against Kabila.

[Just how far the Banyamulenge, as an all-Tutsi referent, have become the target of collective hatreds on the part of “native” Congolese is perhaps best captured by an anecdote. In June 2009 while doing fieldwork in Bukavu I ran into a Congolese friend (Bosco Mushikiwa) I knew while he was doing a PhD at the University of Antwerp. He said he was in charge of running the Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural (ISDR), a local research institute, and went on to ask whether I would like to give a lecture. I quickly accepted the offer. The theme we had agreed upon was *Le Manque d'Etat* (The lack of a State), which I thought was especially appropriate for a Congolese audience. In the course of my comments on the 2006 elections I made the point that the extreme weakness of the Congolese state had led to all sorts of irregularities in the voting process, thus making it virtually impossible for the Banyamulenge minority to gain a meaningful representation in the provincial institutions. Which is why many felt they had no other option than to turn to Nkunda for protection (I refer to the Tutsi warlord whose army brought near chaos to much of North Kivu). At

this point the audience showed signs of considerable unease. And when, adding insult to injury, I said that the quality of a democracy can best be measured by the way it treats its minorities, the room virtually exploded. During the tumultuous question period that followed, there emerged a near consensus about the despicable role played by the Banyamulenge as the allies of Rwanda during the first and second Congo wars; adding to their sins was the support that their Rwandan ally received from the Pentagon and the CIA in the course of the 1996-1997 invasion of North and South Kivu – another reason why the Banyamulenge deserved no mercy.]

The Work of Memory

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that memory matters. It matters because it has a bearing on myth-making and therefore on human actions, a point brilliantly argued by Richard Slotkin. Viewed as “an intellectual or artistic construct”, he writes, “myth draws on the content of individual and collective memory, structures it, and develops from it imperatives for belief and action”.²¹ Hence the need to cut through the magma of half-truths, distortions and obfuscations surrounding the history of violence in the Great Lakes. Getting history right is indeed a necessary first step but by no means a sufficient one to promote a measure of mutual tolerance.

Let me end, therefore, with a few words about “the work of memory”, a phrase I borrow from Paul Ricoeur’s major work on the subject. The crux of Ricoeur’s argument rests on the notion of the “Other” – not as the incarnation of evil but as an interlocutor in a dialogue to change the meaning of evil. This is what he calls “the critical use of memory”. To quote: “Past events cannot be erased: one cannot undo what has been done, nor prevent what has happened. On the other hand, the meaning of what happened, whether inflicted by us unto others, or by them upon us, is not fixed once and for all... Thus what is changed about the past is its moral freight (*sa charge morale*), the weight of the debt it carries... This is how the working of memory opens the way to forgiveness to the extent that it settles a debt by changing the very meaning of the past”.²²

How does this apply to our subject?

The lesson to be learned from Ricoeur is two-fold. One is to resist the temptation to give a free rein to what Eva Hoffman calls “victimological memory”.²³ Nothing is more detrimental to the “critical use of memory” than the repetitive reminiscence of traumatizing moments. There is, of course, every reason for Tutsi vic-

tims to fixate on the unspeakable sufferings they have endured at the hands of the Hutu génocidaires, and, by the same token, for the Hutu victims of the Rwandan army to denounce the atrocities it has committed repeatedly against unarmed civilians, in Kibeho, Byumba, and through much of eastern Congo. However justified, this compulsive urge to rehash past atrocities is unlikely to bring about a constructive meeting of the minds. Instead, and this is the second lesson to be learned from Ricoeur, what is needed is an exercise in narrative history through which stories of the past are told from the point of view of the other.

Much the same argument is made by Eva Hoffman when she invites us “to look beyond the fixed moment of trauma to these longer historical patterns, to supplement partisan memory with a more complex and encompassing view of history – a view that might examine the common history of the antagonistic groups and that might, among other things, enable us to question and criticize dubious and propagandistic uses of collective memory”.²⁴

Once this is said, the crucial question is how to move from discourse to action, from exhortation to practice? This is where formidable difficulties lie ahead. One set of problems relates to the constraints of the Great Lakes environment: how can one expect to bring Hutu and Tutsi into a mutually fruitful *travail de mémoire* where ethnic labels are banished, as in Rwanda? Or where the weight of the unsaid suppresses the exploration of the past, as in Burundi? Or where the continuing violence between Rwanda-backed insurgents and the civilian population only serves to deepen ethnic antagonisms, as in eastern Congo? The answers are anyone’s guess.

Another obstacle stems from the continuing influence of a dominant narrative, in which the Manichean dimension noted earlier, is the key element. The good guys vs bad guys scenario, where the Tutsi are the perennial victims and the Hutu the omnipresent killers, is one that has had, and still has, a profound impact on how the regional conflict is perceived by the international community. Despite, or because of, its simplistic quality it has morphed into a myth, in Slatkin’s sense of the term, from which have emerged imperatives for action (or inaction). Many of the problems facing the region are traceable to the uncritical endorsement of this mythical storyline. My hope in turning a critical eye to conventional wisdom is that I have not substituted one myth for another, but instead opened up a more fruitful historical perspective from which to assess the past and map out the future.

Notes

1. Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (Editions mille et une nuits, nd), p. 31.
2. On the relationship of the Vichy collaborationist regime to France's collective memory see Henry Rousso's outstanding contribution, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944* (Harvard University Press, 1991), Translated by Arthur Goldhammer.
3. See Benjamin Stora, *La Guerre des Mémoires: La France face à son passé colonial* (Editions L'Aube, 2008).
4. For a comparative discussion of the history of ethnic violence in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, see Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
5. For a perfect example, see Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo, "Introduction" in Totten and Ubaldo eds., *We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (Rutgers University Press, 2011), pp 1-23.
6. See, for example, Benjamin Sehene, *Le piège ethnique* (Editions Dagorno, 1999), p. 120.
7. Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda* (Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 118.
8. This is made clear in the Gersony report, after the UNHCR official who revealed the extent of the killings: between 25,000 and 45,000 between the months of April to August 1994. See Alison Des Forges et al., *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (Human Rights Watch and International Federation of Human Rights, 1999), p. 728.
9. See Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghosts*, (Houghton Mifflin, 1998), p. 233 ff.
10. Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence*, chapter 9, and *Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial and Memory* (The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), chapter 2.
11. *UN Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003* (June 2010); for a rebuttal of the report's allegations, see Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Rwanda's Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC*, n.d.
12. Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (Vintage Books, 1988), p. 37. To quote: "The need to divide the field into 'we' and 'they' is so strong that this pattern, this bipartition – friend/enemy – prevails over all others. Popular history is influenced by this Manichean tendency which shuns half-tints and complexities". Ibid.
13. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History", *Representations*, 26 (Spring 1989), p. 9.
14. Paul Kagame, "Preface", in Phil Clark and Zachary Kaufman eds., *After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond* (Hurst and Co., 2008), pp. xxiv, xxiii.
15. Jan Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom* (The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 4.
16. Ibid.
17. See Bert Ingelaere, *Living Together Again, The Expectation of Transitional Justice in Burundi*, IOB Working Paper 2009/6.

18. Stef Vandeginste, "Burundi's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to shed light on the Past while Standing in the Dark Shadow of Politics?", *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* (2012), p. 5.
19. Ibid., p. 2.
20. Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 115.
21. Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (Wesleyan University Press, 1973), p.7.
22. Paul Ricoeur, "Le pardon peut-il guérir?", *Esprit* (March-April 1995), p. 78.
23. Eva Hoffman, "The Balm of Recognition", in Nicholas Owen ed., *Human Rights, Human Wrongs* (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 296.
24. Ibid., p. 302.